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CONTRACTS-INNOMINATE TERMS : CONTRACTUALENCOUNTERS OFTHE
THIRDKIND.-A major function ofthe law of contract is to ensure that
the reasonable expectations of the contracting parties are met and
enforced .' In turn, those expectations will be conditioned and in-
formed by the anticipated legal consequences that will attach to
proposed or actual agreements .2 This "supportive" role of contract
law was clearly recognised by John Austin:3
Now, as much of the business of human life turns or moves upon conventions,
frequent disappointments ofthose expectations which conventions naturally ex-
cite, wouldrenderhuman society a scene ofbaffled hopes andofthwarted projects
and labours. To preventdisappointments of suchexpectations, is therefore amain
object of the legal and moral rules whose direct and appropriate purpose is the
enforcement of pacts or agreements .
Yet, the protection and promotion of such interests is not the only
function of contract law. Contract law is not exclusively designed to
facilitate business activities or oil the wheels of commerce; it has a
responsibility to fulfil in regulating and controlling business practices
and, thereby, contribute to the solution of the problems of economic
justice. Contract lawmust not allow itself to, be used to reinforce and
perpetuate economic inequalities ; "justice and the interests of society
are furthered when the law to some extent ranges itself upon the side
of the party who for some reason or another is unable properly to
safeguardhisowninterests" .a Obviously, this "regulatory"role will
be more appropriate in certain types of agreements, such as contracts
between consumers andmanufacturers. Inlarge commercial contracts
between independent corporations the "regulatory" role will be of
less importance .
Contract law is concerned with planned relationships of an
economic natures The formation of a contract creates risks. In most
cases, the contracting parties will have allocated betweenthemselves.
the foreseeable risks and the law provides various devices by which
such risks might be allocated. If the contracting parties fail to allocate
or foresee certain risks, contract law will determine whichparty is to
' See Farnsworth, "Meaning" in the LawofContracts(1967), 76 Yale L.J. 939, at
p. 951.
z The reliance by businesses on the law, especially in continuing relationships, is
open to severe doubts see Macauley, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in The
ManufacturingIndustry (1963), Vol 9,The PracticalLawyer 13 andBeale and Dugdale,
Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and Use ofContractual Remedies (1975), 2
Brit. J. o¬L. & Soc. 45 .
3 Lectures on Jurisprudence (2nd ed ., 1861), pp . 299-300.
C. Havinghurst, The Nature of Private Contract (1961), p. 111 and J. Stone,
Social Dimensions of Law and Justice (1966),. pp . 251-254.
s For an excellent analvsis o¬ contract as an exchange transaction. see I.R .
Macneil, Cases and Materials on Contract (1971) .
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bear those risks. As such, contract law is an institutitional attempt
"to mark out a range and an apportionment of risks" .' In so far as
legal doctrine contributes to the planning or drafting of agreements, $
the law must be certain so as to permit the parties to allocate risks with
certainty and, thereby, ensure that appropriate insurance arrange-
ments are effected ; "it is an important function of a court . . . to
provide [contracting parties] with legal certainty at the negotiating
stage" . 9 Uncertainty will mean that an informed allocation of risks
cannot be made and this may lead to over-insurance . t°
Nevertheless, although predictability and certainty has obvious
and substantial commercial advantages, contract law must strive to
incorporate a dimension of flexibility in order to accommodate and
reflect the complex reality of commercial activity."t Indeed, a due
measure of flexibility contributes to certainty in the long run by
avoiding anomalous situations . Of course, in so doing, it is important
that the possibility for reasonable planning is not seriously curtailed
or impaired ." In all contractual arrangements, a predominant con-
cern of the contracting parties and their legal advisors is the availabil-
ity and nature of remedies when a contract is broken, especially the
circumstances in which an innocent party in entitled to treat the
contract as being at an end . In recent years, English courts have
attempted to move away from a rigid categorisation of contractual
terms and, through the introduction of innominate terms, to move
towards a more commercially responsive and realistic formulation of
contract law . Unfortunately their efforts have tended to exacerbate
rather than ameliorate the situation . 13
e See Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices
(1924), 24 Col . L . Rev . 335 .
Llewellyn, What Price Contract'?-An Essay in Perspective (1931), 40 Yale L .J .
704, at p . 746 .
s See Photo ProductionsLtdv . SecuricorLtd, [1980] 2 W.L.R . 283, atp . 289, per
Lord Wilberforce .
e FederalCommerce v . Trada.rErport, [19781 A .C . 1, at p . 8, per Lord Diploek .
For other judicial statements of the need for certainty, see Pau On v . Lau Yin, [ 1980]
A .C . 614, at p . 634, per Lord Scarman ; Photo Productions, ibid., at p . 296, per Lord
Diplock ; White & Carter (Councils) Ltd . v . McGregor, [ 1962] A .C . 413, at p . 430, per
Lord Reid; and Woodhouse A.C . Israel Cocoa Ltd v, Nigerian Produce Marketing Co .,
[1972] A.C . 741, at p . 758, per Lord Hailsham .
" It must be remembered that insurance only reduces the risk, it does not dispense
with it completely . As Macneil notes, "instead of a risk of a large loss, the insured has a
certain smaller loss, namely the premium", op . cit ., footnote 5, p . 805 .
" See Reardon-Smith Line v . Kanzen-Tangen, [19761 1 W.L .R . 989, at p . 998,
per Lord Wilberforce .
'= See Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism : Change in the Function of the
Judicial Process and Law (1980), 65 Iowa L . Rev . 1249, at p . 1275 .
'a In his inaugural lecture, Professor Trietel suggested that innominate terms are
part ofa broader legal trend ; "a process by which reasonably precise rules are replaced
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Revolution or Aberration
Traditionally, the English law of contract has maintained a sim-
ple bifurcation of contractual terms and the identity of a term is the
exclusive determinant ofthe remedy available . A condition is a major
ingredient of an agreement and its breach entitles the victim to repudi-
ate and claim for damages . On the other hand, a warranty is only a
subsidiary term of an agreement and its breach can be adequately
remedied by the recovery of damages ; no right to repudiate arises .
Once a term is identified as being a condition, any breach ofthat term
gives rise to the right to repudiate . There is no additional requirement
that the victim must actually be seriously prejudiced; a trivial breach
will suffice .' 4 ,
In 1962, this rigid bipartite categorisation was severely shaken
by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Hong Kong Fir Shipping Ltd
v . Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd ." The defendants chartered a ship
from the plaintiffs for a period of twenty-four months . Due to antiqu-
ated machinery and incompetent staff, twenty weeks were lost and the
defendants repudiated the contract . Although the plaintiffs admitted
that they were in breach of a "seaworthiness" clause, they claimed
that the defendants were only entitled to damages and that their
repudiation was wrongful . In the event, the plaintiffs prevailed . 16
Yet, while the decision was unremarkable, if quite hard on the
charterer, the reasoning of the court was little short of
"revolutionary" . 17 The Court of Appeal refused to treat the dual
categorisation of contractual terms as exhaustive ; such a simple
dichotomy distorted the complex reality of business life . In the words
of the landmark judgment of Diplock L.J . : 18
by . . . vague or open-textured terms" : see Doctrine and Discretion in the Law of
Contract (1981), p. 2.
'a See, for example, Re Moore&Co . Ltd andLandover &Co ., [1921] 2K.B . 519;
Jackson v. Rotax Motor & Cycle Co ., [1910] 2 K.B . 937 and Arcos Ltd v. E. A.
Ronaasen & Sons, [1933] A.C . 470.
's [1962] 2 Q.B . 26 . For a contemporary discussion of the case, see Furmston,
Note (1962), 25 Mod. L. Rev. 584, and Reynolds, Warranty Condition and Fundam-
ental Term (1963), 79 L.Q . Rev. 534 . For an early criticism of the simple bifurcation,
see Montrose (1960), 23 Mod. L. Rev. 550.
's The case was similarly decided at first instance by Salmon J., [196112W.L.R .
76 . For a short note on this decision, see Sealy, [1981] Camb . L.J . 152.
" See Atiyah, Book Review (1981), 1 L.S . 100, at p. 103 and The Sale of Goods
(6th ed ., 1980), pp . 42 and 45 .
' $ Supra, footnote 15, at p. 72 . Diplock L.J .'s use of"rescind" is confusing forhe
presumably means "repudiate"; the two terms are different and cannot be used inter-
changeably . Whereas repudiation means terminating an existing contract, rescission
renders a contract void ab initio . For a good account of the importance ofkeeping them
separate, seeDawson, FundamentalBreach of Contract (1975), 9 L.Q . Rev. 380, atpp .
393-399 . Failure to do so caused Megarry J . considerable difficulties in Horsler v.
Zorro, [197512. W.L.R . 183 .
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What the judge had to do in the present case, as in any other case where one party
to a contract relies upon a breach by the other partyas giving him a right to elect to
rescind the contract, and the contract itself makes no express provision as to this,
was to look at the events which had occurred as a result of the breach at the time at
which the characters purported to rescind the charterparty and to decide whether
the occurrence of these events deprived the charterers ofsubstantially the whole
benefit which it was the intention of the parties as expressed in the charterparty
that the charterers should obtain from the further performance of their own
contractual undertakings .
Accordingly, Hong Kong Fir recognised the existence of a third
category of contractual terms . Whereas any breach of a condition or
warranty gives rise to a previously and precisely ascertainable re
medy, the remedy available on the breach of an "innominate term" is
not so ascertainable at the time of making the agreement . Whether
there is a right to repudiate will depend upon the actual repercussions
of the breach . It is not the nature of the term broken but the effect of
the breach that will determine the remedy available .
The subsequent judicial treatment of Hong Kong Fir was predict-
ably ambivalent . With characteristic conservatism, the courts have
begrudgingly recognised the existence of "innominate terms", but
endeavoured to neutralise the potentially radical impact of that deci-
sion . In the MihalisAngelos,19 the Court of Appeal was happy to hold
that a "readiness to load" clause in a charterparty was a condition and
not an innominate term . The court expressly opted for increased
certainty at the expense of greater flexibility . In The Hansa Nord,'°
the Court of Appeal held that a clause in a sale of goods contract
requiring "shipment to be made in good condition" should not be
treated as a condition, but as an innominate term . Moreover, as the
breach did not go to the root ofthe contract, the buyer was not entitled
to repudiate by rejecting the goods . Also, in Federal Commerce, 21 the
House of Lords treated a clause in a time-charter requiring the master
to follow the charterers' orders as an innominate term.
These decisions left the law in a state of considerable confusion .
Although Hong Kong Fir'' has introduced a third category of con-
tractual stipulation in order to bring the law more in line with commer-
cial reality, it had failed to specify the indicia by which such terms
could be identified . The choice for the courts was clear . It could revert
to the original traditional bifurcation with its considerable appeal of
predictability, even though it might distort reality, the contracting
'v Maredelanto Compania Noviera S.A . v . Bergbau-Handel G.m.b.H . The
AfihalisAngelos . [1971) 1 Q .13 . 164 . For an extended discussion of this case, see Greig,
Condition-or Warranty? (1973), 89 L.Q . Rev . 93 .
zo Cehave N.V . v . Bremer Handelsgesellschaft tn .b.H . The Hansa Nord, [1976]
Q . B . 44 .
2 ' Supra, foonote 9 .
22 Supra, footnote 15 .
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parties would be able to ascertain their legal obligations. and entitle-
ments at the time of making the - agreement . On the other hand, the
tripartite classification could be retained with its greater elasticity,
provided a thorough analysis of the constitutional and distinguishing
properties of "innominate terms" was effected . The forlorn hopewas
expressed that "complete understanding must await a decision ofthe
House of Lords" .23 Sadly, the House did not warm to such a chall-
enge.
A Tarnished Opportunity
In Bunge Corporation, New York v. Tradax Export, S.A .
Panama," the House was presented with, but missed agolden op-
portunity. In essence, there was a contract for the sale of 15,000 tons of
soya beans of which delivery was to be made in three consignments of
5,000 tons each . The contract provided that the buyers, Bunge
Corporation, should give fifteen days' notice before each shipment
and specify the vessel to be used . In breach of this "probable readi-
ness to load" clause, Bungegave only fourteen days' notice in respect
of the second consignment. Although the contract was silentas to the
status of this stipulation, the sellers, Tradax S.A., contended that this
breach was sufficiently serious to entitle them to repudiate the con-
tract. Incredibly, this issue occupied the attention of five different
tribunals over six years, only one of the fifteen members found for
Bunge and, at the end of the day, no clear statement of general
principle emerged from this extensive litigation .25 The House of
Lords, unanimously affirming the "powerful and closely
reasoned' 26 judgment of Megaw L.J . in the Court of Appeal,27 held,
as in The Mihalis Angelos,28 that the relevant clause was, as a matter
of construction, a condition and, therefore, Tradax was entitled to
repudiate the contract .
23 M. P_ Furmston, Cheshire and Fifoot's Law of Contract (9th ed ., 1976), 143.
The major source of difficulty lies in the failure of the courts to heed Diplock L.J .'s
jurisprudential advice : ". . . the common law evolves not merely in breeding new
principles, but also, when they are fully grown, by burying their progenitors" ; See
supra, footnote 15, at p. 71 .
24 [1981) 1 W.L.R . 711. For a comment on this case, see Reynolds, (1981), 97
L.Q . Rev. 541 .
25
Ibid ., at p. 723, per Lord Roskill. As he went onto say, "the `relevantphrase'
`give at least 15 consecutive days' notice' consists only+ of six words and two digits . But
the able arguments of which your lordships have had the benefit have extended over
three full days" . After the issue was decided by an umpire, there was an appeal to the
Board ofAppeal of GAFTA, another appeal to Parker J. in the Commercial Court, on to
the Court of Appeal (Megaw, Browne and BrightmanL.J .J. ), and, finally to the House
of Lords (Lords Wilberforce, Fraser, Scarman, Lowry and Roskill) .
26 Ibid .
27 [1980] 1 LI . Rep. 294, at pp . 297-309 .
2s Supra, footnote 19 .
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In reaching this decision, their lordships exposed the "fundam-
ental fallacy"29 of the arguments urged in support ofBunge . Counsel
had argued that, since the parties had left their intentions as to the
contractual status of the "readiness" clause unexpressed, the issue
could be disposed of by the application of the test contained in
Diplock L.J .'s classic judgment in Hong Kong Fir ; namely, that to
justify repudiation, the breach must be such as to deprive the innocent
party of substantially the whole benefit of the contract . Accordingly,
it was argued, Tradax was not entitled to repudiate because the breach
did not have such an effect . The House of Lords unanimously rejected
the force of this argument . It held, in effect, that the mere failure of
the parties to express their intention as to what rights should be
available in event of breach is a necessary but not a sufficient char-
acteristic for the existence of an innominate term . 30
Regrettably, the House of Lords did not proceed to enumerate
those other characteristics sufficiently to signify the existence of
innominate terms . It contented itself with a slight but necessary
emendation of Diplock L.J.'s account of such terms so as to make it
clear that a term may nevertheless be a condition despite the lack of
any express intention to that effect in the contract ." Obviously, a
contrary decision would utterly fail to explain the status of terms
already established as conditions as a matter of statutory or judicial
implication .32 Furthermore, the House of Lords continued to rely
upon and cite with approval the standard tests of vague generality to
29 Supra, footnote 24, at p . 715 .
ao As Megaw L.J . stated "no-one now doubts the correctness of [Hong Kong Fir] :
that there are intermediate [sic] terms . . .", supra, footnote 27, at p . 307 . The
tendency of thejudges to use the labels "innominate" and "intermediate" interchange
ably can scarcely contribute to clarity of exigesis ; for the introduction of the appellation
"intermediate", see Bremer v . Vanden, [1978] 2 LI . Rep . 109, at p . 113, per Lord
Wilberforce . It is suggested that neither term is wholly satisfactory .
s' Supra, footnote 24, at pp . 715 and 725, per Lords Wilberforce and Roskill
respectively . Furthermore, as Lords Wilberforce and Lowry noted "[Diplock L.J .'s
judgment] does not profess to be more than clarificatory" and "by his illuminating
analysis purport to establish a new light on old and accepted pricniples ; he did not
purport to establish new ones" : ibid., at pp . 715 and 719 . This is a splendid example of
the declaratory theory of common law at work and Hercules J . would be proud of
Diplock L.J .'s achievement ; see R . M . Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1979),
passim .
12 See, for example, Sale of Goods Act 1979, c . 54, ss 12-15 ; Behn v . Burness
(1863), 1 B . & S . 751 ; and the Mihalis Angelos, supra, footnote 19 . For a modern
judicial analysis of "conditions", see SchulerA .G . v . Wick'7naü Machine Tool Sale Ltd,
[1974] A.C. 235 and Reardon-Smith, supra, footnote 11 . As Ormrod L.J . said "a
decision inone case will, in effect, categorise the stipulation for other cases inwhich the
same form is used" ; see CehaveN.V . v . Bremet-Hazzdelsgesellsclzaftnz .b.H . TheHansa
Nord, supra, footnote 20, at p . 62 .
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identify conditions, especially those contained in the judgment of
Bowen L.J . in Bentsen v. Taylor . 33
A New Formula
The recognition of a new "species" of "innominate" or "int-
ermediate" terms also calls into question the established tests for
identifying terms where the parties have left their intentions unex
pressed . The inherent weakness of the traditional formulae is thatthey
were devised at a time when only a simple dichotomy existed and it
was only necessary to concentrate on specifying the properties of one
term; for if a term was not a condition, it must be a warranty . If the
courts are to insist on a tripartite categorisation of contractual terms, a
completely new test must be formulated that captures and better
reflects this state of affairs . 34 Prior to Bunge v . Tradax, the courts
maintained that unless a term was a condition as a matter of express
intention or on the basis of previous authority, there was a presump-
tion that the term was innominate . 35 The form ofthis presumption had
never been fully explored, especially in regard to the quality and
quantity of evidence required in rebuttal . The House of Lords in
Bunge v . Tradax did not advert to this approach and the decision
suggests, but does not articulate, an altogether different approach
which concentrates on the substantive rather than the presumptive
distinction between conditions and innominate terms . It is also clear
that the new approach must focus on this distinction and not, as in the
traditional approach, on the difference between conditions and warr-
anties, for a breach of warranty can never give rise to a right to
repudiate .
Accordingly, the logic of admitting the existence of innominate
terms as a discrete category of contractual stipulation requires a
reappraisal of the logical and constitutional properties of conditions .
The difficulty with the old test for identifying conditions is that it must
also be satisfied in the case of those innominate terms that give rise to
the right to repudiate . The challenge is to define a new formula to
discriminate between conditions and innominate terms with sufficient
precision so as to accommodate the crucial characteristic of a condi-
tion : that is, while a breach may not in fact substantially deprive a
party of the entire benefit of the contract, it will always generate a
right to repudiate . This reveals that the focus for a new approach must
sensibly be put on the consequences of a breach . Quite apart from the
33 [1 8 9312 Q.B . 274, at p. 291 .
34 In Schuler, Lord Wilberforce interpreted Hong Kong Fir as not casting any
doubt on the meaning of "conditions" ; supra, footnote 32, at p. 262. As to whether
such a tripartite categorisation is desirable, see infra.
35 See Reardon-Smith, supra, footnote 11 .
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denial of self-help remedies entailed by such an approach, any breach
which is serious enough in its effects will always have a repudiatory
quality and there will be no way to distinguish conditions from
innominate terms . Accordingly, scrutiny must instead be devoted to
the properties of the term itself, which is a question which may be
decided in advance of breach at the moment of contracting . Notwith-
standing their failure to stipulate expressly, the parties are surely
entitled to be able to ascertain at the time of contracting, what rights
and obligations their consensual bargain has imposed on them .
However, the question of what are the characteristics of a condition,
which distinguish it from an innominate term, does not admit of any
easy answer . As Megaw L .J . underlined in the Court of Appeal,
although any breach of a condition gives rise to the right to repudiate,
it does not follow that there has been a loss of substantially the whole
benefit of the contract . Therefore, the test for a condition is not
co-extensive with an inquiry into whether each and every breach must
have that effect . If this were the test, no term could ever pass such a
stringent test and conditions would cease to exist . It is always possible
to imagine some set of circumstances, however remote or fanciful,
which would not result in the loss ofsubstantially all the benefit of the
contract . ;6
Although such a test is condemned by its own excesses, it does
suggest a more acceptable approach . For, if instead ofasking whether
every breach of a term would actually result in the loss ofsubstantially
the whole contract . i t could be asked whether every potential breach
might have this effect . In this way, it does indeed become possible to
determine in advance the difference between conditions and innomin-
ate terms . The justification for granting the innocent party a right to
repudiate the contract is that the contract is rendered substantially less
beneficial than it would have been, but for the breach . However, the
assessment of the extent of the benefit which is to be gained from the
business of contracting is, like all other contractual risks, capable of
being anticipated before performance and, therefore, ahead of
breach . It is at that time that the categorisation of terms into condi-
tions, innominate terms and warranties is, if not made express,
assumed by the parties . It may be that the effects of a breach of a term
assumed to be of the first importance to the contract are not in fact
greatly prejudicial . Yet that cannot justify the re-opening of an issue
in the light of subsequent events which has already been decided by
the act of bargaining . If a term is such that, at the time ofcontracting,
it can fairly be said that each and every breach ofit might result in the
loss of substantially the whole benefit of the contract, that should be
enough to fix that term with the status of a condition . However, as
events unfold, its breach is easily remediable . In that case, no doubt,
'° See Buuge v . Tradax (C.A .), supra, footnote 27, at p . 308, per R4egaw L .J .
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the innocentparty will avail himselfofhis option wisely . Onthe other
hand, if it cannot be said that each and every breach might have that
effect, the term will be an innominate term and the availability of a
precise remedy for its breach must await the determination of the
effects of its breach .
Typically, a condition will be aterm that can only be broken in
oneway and this fact, in the light of the factors known to the parties at
the time of contracting, will have fundamental significance for the
contract as awhole. Thus, a contractual stipulation as to time, such as
an expected readiness to load clause or title to goods, can only be
broken in one way . Its significance is that the range of consequences
of breach is predictably narrow and may fairly be treated as being
fundamental . Innominate terms will be those which can be broken in a
variety of ways because, although each is expressed substantively as a
single term, it is in essence a bundle of obligations; some of great and
others of small significance to the contract . Consequently, it will not
be possible, atthe time of contracting, to say of such a term that each
and every breach even mighthave the potentially catastrophic effect
required to give it a repudiatory quality . As Upjohn L.J . emphasised
in Hong Kong Fir itself.37
Whyis this apparently basic and underlying condition of seaworthiness not, in
fact, treated as a condition? It is for the simple reason that the seaworthiness
clause is breached by the slightestfailureto be fitted "in every way" for service .
Thus, to take examples from the judgments insome of the cases I have mentioned
above, if a nail is missing from one ofthe timbers ofa wooden vessel or if proper
medical supplies or-two anchors are not on board at the time ofsailing, theowners
are in breach of the seaworthiness stipulation . It is contrary to common sense to
suppose that in such circumstances the parties contemplated that the charterer
should at oncebe entitled to treat the contract as at end for such trifling breaches .
In summary, therefore, the proposed regime of contractual
stipulation would consist of three clearly defined and separate
categories .3' Acontractual term wouldbe a condition if every breach
of it might deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole
benefit of the contract ; a right to repudiate the contract would be
available whatever the actual effects of breach . A contractual term
would be an innominate clause if some, but not necessarily every
breach might deprive the innocent party of substantially the whole
benefit of the contract ; .aright to repudiate the contract would only be
available if the breach did in fact result in the innocent party being
deprived of substantially, the whole benefit of the contract . A con-
tractual term would be a warranty if its breach could never deprive the
"supra, footnote 15, at pp 62-63. Upjohn L.J . repeated his views in Astley
Independent Trust v. Grimley, [196312 All E.R . 33, at pp . 46-47.
as Lord I3ailsham described conditions and warranties as "mutually exclusive and
starkly contrasted compartments" ; see London & Clydeside Estates Ltd v. Aberdeen
D.C ., [1980] 1 W.L.R . 182, at p. 189.
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innocent party of substantially the whole benefit of the contract ; a
right to repudiate the contract would never arise .
The major appeal of such a regime of contractual stipulations is
that it rightly concentrates on the several ways in which a term might
be broken rather than upon the term itself . 39 Moreover, it introduces a
dimension of realistic flexibility without any appreciable diminution
in predictability . Indeed, the critical balance between "the equity ofa
particular situation" and "the overmastering need of certainty in the
transactions of commercial life"4° has been left undisturbed . The
parties remain entirely free to categorise expressly any term of a
contract as a condition . As Lord Diplock noted, in regard to shipping
parties, when the parties "are matched in bargaining power", they
are "at liberty to enter into [agreements] in whatever contractual
terms they please" ." If the parties fail to stipulate expressly the
contractual status of any term in their agreement, the need ofcertainty
is no longer of relevance . In such circumstances of unexpressed
intention, the courts ought surely to look to the justice of the situation .
This will require an inquiry into the possible consequences of breach .
Accordingly, when there is a gap or failure in planning by the contr-
acting parties, as there inevitably will be in complex and continuing
contractual arrangements, 42 the court must focus its attention on
performance and not formation . The proposed tripartite regime best
reflects such concerns . Nevertheless, it remains a matter for future
debate as to whether the introduction of a third category of contractual
term is desirable . Its mere existence and the ensuing difficulties
attached to identifying and distinguishing an innominate term from
other terms is likely to provide further grist for the litigation mill .
There is much to be said for a regime that simply recognises two
categories of contractual term; a breach of one type justifying
termination and a breach of another not so doing . A decision on which
category any particular contractual term falls into will depend on the
express or implied choice of the parties ; the finding of an implied
choice being a matter of construction on all the circumstances of the
case .
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON*
JOHN N. WAKEFIELDt
39 See Lord Devlin, [1966] Camb . L.J . 192, at p . 204 .
4 B .N . Cardozo, The Growth of Law (1924), pp . 110-111 .
4' Federal Commerce, supra, footnote 9, at p . 7 .
42 See Macneil, op . cit ., footnote 5, at p . 716 .
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